



CIA Director Richard Helms (left) talks with Newbold Noyes Jr., president of the American

Society of Newspaper Editors and editor of The Star, during the editors' conference yesterday.

—United Press International

Soviet Buildup 'Relentless'

The "relentless" Soviet weapons buildup poses a serious threat to the entire American deterrent force of bombers, missiles and submarines, Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., warned today.

The Soviet Union, he said, is "like a burglar walking down a hotel corridor trying the door-handles. When he finds one unlocked in he goes."

Speaking to a luncheon meeting of the American Society of Newspaper editors, Jackson said many of his fellow politicians, caught in a cross fire between "hawks" and "doves," are "acquiring the protective habits of the ostrich."

Jackson, the only outspoken "hawk" among the possible Democratic contenders for the presidency next year, said he had little hope for the Nixon administration's attempt to move from a period of confrontation to a period of negotiation.

New Missiles Cited

The Washington senator, who revealed earlier this year that the Soviet Union had been

for what may be a new large missile, said they had the ability to deploy 70 of the new missiles in a single year.

"And if they do deploy 70 of the new missiles they would be adding in this one year alone more megatonnage (or destructive power) than the United States has in its entire land-based Minuteman ICBM system," he declared.

At the same time, he said, the Russians have been pursuing a vigorous research and development program that has included "extensive tests of various new antiballistic missile components, including advanced improved ABM radars."

Not Slowing Down

"The central fact is that the Soviet Union has continued to support, at great cost, a comprehensive, forward-moving program of strategic and conventional weapons procurement that is not slowing down," he declared.

"On the contrary, the hopes of those who predicted the Soviet buildup was tapering off have been bitterly disappointed several times."

"The Administration has made the claim that we are leaving an 'era of confrontation' and entering an 'era of negotiation.'"

"I see scant evidence to support such a sunny forecast concerning our relations with Moscow. The massive Soviet weapons buildup does not suggest to me that with greater strength they will be more wary of confrontations," he said.

Jackson said the United States should take two immediate steps to meet the Soviet threat: Protect its Minuteman deterrent force and press more vigorously for an agreement in the strategic arms limitation talks.

Rejects Limited Aim

He rejected the Soviet proposal for an agreement to limit ABM deployment only. Instead, he said, the two sides should agree to limit deployment of offensive weapons while leaving open the chance for each to deploy ABM systems to protect their missiles, but not their populations.

"Such a program would greatly reduce the Soviet strategic forces. Moreover, it

should calm any possible Soviet concern that we might be increasing the offensive potential of our forces so as to threaten the security of their deterrent.

"I would hope, therefore, that such a proposal would be vigorously pressed at the SALT talks," Jackson said.

Warns on Credibility

In a Senate speech, one of Jackson's colleagues, Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., said government efforts to discredit the news media could be dangerous to a free society.

"If the credibility of any news media can be shaken, a major obstacle to acceptance by the public of all that a government wishes to be believed is removed," he declared.

Richard M. Helms, in his first public speech in five years as director of the CIA, yesterday told the editors that spies inside the Kremlin played a key role in the 1932 Cuban missile crisis and implied that some of them still are operating in the Soviet Union.

By making the claim at this time, Helms apparently sought to serve notice to the Kremlin

Our Intelligence in Vietnam, And Why It

By STEPHEN E. AMBROSE

HOW can our intelligence be so miserably, consistently bad? Between them, the CIA and the intelligence branches of the three armed services have a budget that probably exceeds the GNP of North Vietnam. They have agents everywhere, extensive and sophisticated lines of communications to get information back to headquarters, the most modern and complex computers to sift and analyze the raw material, and the best brains in the country to read the computer feed-outs and explain the big picture. There is precious little romance in the process, as in the old days of spying, but our information gathering and evaluation techniques represent the culmination of modern American technology. We have committed our best tools and our best men, and we have failed.

It has been so from the beginning. In 1965 the Air Force informed the President that its intelligence indicated that a few weeks of bombing in North Vietnam would bring the enemy to his knees. In 1965 and 1967 Army intelligence concentrated on the infra-structure of the enemy in the villages. Isolate the Viet Cong, the formula ran, and the rebellion will dry up. Unfortunately for the Army, for every V.C. identified and eliminated, two more sprang up. During the same period Air Force intelligence indicated that the bombing campaign was destroying North Vietnam's ability to

fight, while the interdiction bombing in Laos and Cambodia had made it impossible for the enemy to get supplies into South Vietnam. The CIA and the services used every index they could invent—all pointed to the collapse of the enemy. When McNamara and Rusk and Johnson told us we had turned the corner, or spoke of light at the end of the tunnel, they were not whistling in the dark. They based their optimistic predictions on absolutely complete, absolutely reliable information. The enemy had no offensive capacity left and would soon wither away.

Then came Tet. It was an intelligence disaster of an order of magnitude equaled only by Pearl Harbor and MacArthur's assurance that the Chinese would not enter the Korean war even if American troops marched to the Yalu. Tet was one of the few major, widespread ground offensives in human history to catch the defenders completely by surprise.

The American response was not to reevaluate the technique, but to step it up. We sent in or bought additional agents, created better communications, added more computers, and set up extra committees in Saigon and the Pentagon to collate everything. We built incredible devices to find out where the enemy was—devices that could, for example, take the temperature of an area and on that basis indicate whether there were human beings gathered together under the jungle cover. We flew reconnaissance missions all over Indochina, taking millions of photographs with cameras so sensitive that they could pick up the numbers on an auto license plate from 10,000 feet and more.

Armed with all this information, the intelligence people went to Nixon and said we had a great opportunity at hand. The North Vietnamese were concentrated in a few narrow areas of Cambodia. Foolishly, they had even placed their command headquarters for the entire war near the Cambodian border. COSVN, the intelligence people said it was called. We could pick off the nerve center of the entire enemy war effort in a short campaign and, if not end the war, at least buy time in which to prepare the ARVN to fight the battles. Nixon believed, and who can blame him? The best intelligence service in the world was positive.

So the President went on television to speak of Stalingrad and the Bulge and other great battles. He told the American people their sons were about to win a victory that would be just as decisive. He explained

COSVN in detail and then outlined the process whereby our troops were going to surround and capture great numbers of the enemy, in an operation comparable only to the German blitzkrieg in Poland, France, and Russia.

When he next appeared on television, the President showed us movies highlighting the results of the Cambodian invasion. We had captured some rice and a few small arms. He did not mention COSVN or enemy troops. A few months later, American intelligence thought it spotted a PW camp, so we raided North Vietnam—and again came up with nothing.

Now comes Laos. Intelligence had finally figured out that the stupendous interdiction campaign against the Ho Chi Minh Trail had not worked. Still there was hope. American intelligence sources indicated that the North Vietnamese were weak, while ARVN was growing stronger. With a little American air support, ARVN could move into Laos and physically occupy the trail, thus cutting the enemy supply line completely. The results of this latest blunder are too painful to discuss.

How could it happen? The men involved in the intelligence process are not stupid, the technology they have at their disposal does work. Everyone involved in the system works long, hard hours. They know that men's lives depend on the accuracy of the information they gather, so they check and double-check everything. Yet they are always wrong.

One factor, of course, is common to all spying. Men believe what they want to believe—the classic example is Jack Kennedy's belief in the CIA's assertion that the Cuban people were thoroughly anti-Castro

and would rise up against him at the first small sign of outside support, such as a landing at the Bay of Pigs.

The more important factor is in the broadest sense political. No one, not even we Americans, has yet devised a method of gathering intelligence that can operate without the support of the people. The Battle of the Bulge could never have occurred in France, for example, because while Eisenhower's armies were operating in France his intelligence was superb. He always knew where the Germans were and what they were up to, for the simple reason that the Germans could not hide their movements from the people of France, and the vast majority of Frenchmen wanted the Allies to win. Thus they reported, accurately and truthfully, what they saw. When Ike's armies got to the German border, they lost this advantage, which allowed the Germans to mount a secret attack.

In a war zone, people give information to the side they want to win—that is, they make a political choice. Nothing provides quite so clear or conclusive an answer to the question—whose side is the ordinary Vietnamese on?—than the failure of our intelligence. Every time a Vietnamese peasant tells the truth to the Viet Cong or lies to the Americans, he is casting a vote—the only vote that counts. No intelligence service in the world can operate successfully in such a situation, not even

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
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A military view

Intelligence change may peril security

By LT. GEN. IRA C. EAKER,
USAF (Ret.)

A recent Pentagon release advised that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) would report directly to the defense secretary and not to or through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as in the past. Apparently, the JCS now will have no intelligence advisers reporting directly to them.



Lt. Gen. Eaker

This organizational change could represent a hazard to national security. Deprived of prompt and thorough intelligence, immediately available, the joint chiefs scarcely can discharge their function, assigned by the national defense act, of serving as the principal military advisers to the defense secretary and the President.

Prior to World War II, foreign intelligence came to the defense decision makers from two uncoordinated sources. Our ambassadors abroad reported to the secretary of state. Our military attaches rendered reports from their military contacts and observations to the secretaries of War and Navy.

OUR EXPERIENCE in World War II indicated the need for a third, more active, intelligence organization and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was created. This agency rendered such valuable service that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) later was established to perform many of the functions of the wartime OSS.

The President and his Cabinet, the civilian side, then had this source of intelligence reporting directly to them.

The JCS and the military side had the DIA, formed after the war by combining the intelligence functions of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

These two intelligence channels, one on the civilian side and the other on the military side, have provided needed checks and balances. There are many cases where disaster was averted by this dual-

failures, such as Pearl Harbor, the Cuban missile crisis and the Pueblo incident, can be traced to the failure of the defense decision makers fully to use the evidence provided by one or another of these two intelligence channels.

UNDER THE NEW system it will be possible that an imperious defense secretary might say: "This is my decision; now give me an intelligence estimate to support it." This occurred prior to Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird's tenure.

There must be real concern when the JCS has to get intelligence secondhand. It also makes less certain that the commander in chief always will get sound intelligence estimates.

McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's principal national security adviser, it will be remembered, is reported to have said that there obviously were no Red missiles in Cuba, since it would be irrational for the Kremlin to put them there. But from the military intelligence side came the unmistakable evidence to the contrary, the U-2 photographs.

The civilian intelligence agencies and those under military jurisdiction historically have operated somewhat differently. The civilian side estimates what will happen, with reasons, while the military always has emphasized enemy capabilities, what he could do, with less emphasis on what he might do.

A CRITICAL and current example will illustrate this difference.

The civilian intelligence estimate might advise the President: "There is no evidence that the Reds now are servicing their nuclear submarines in Cuba." The military estimate, based on the same evidence, might say instead: "The Red base in Cuba is completed and ready to service Russian subs at any time."

The defense decision makers could be reassured by the former estimate but alerted by the latter.

The dual intelligence channels are like the human being with two ears and two eyes. This is no time for the United States to commit national mayhem, thus sight in one eye.

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Cuba Must Be Freed!

According to a number of sources, including the newsletter, Exclusive, published by the Special Reports, Inc., several months ago the CIA officially expressed to President Nixon its alarm over the Soviet Union's military actions involving Cuba. This was even before the construction of the Soviet nuclear submarine base at Cienfuegos.

It seems that early last May, U.S. defense and intelligence experts learned that huge Soviet bombers—the USSR's equivalent of our own B-52—were making frequent non-stop flights from

bases in Russia to Communist Cuba.

The implications of this should be clear to any American. These planes could be packed with nuclear bombs and sent over the United States before we would know what happened. Readers will recall that a few months ago a plane from Cuba landed right near the presidential plane in Florida—coming in undetected by any defense system!

This entire affair points up the fact that the United States is under serious risk of attack as long as Cuba remains in communist hands.

Instead of seeing to it that we keep some agreement not to overthrow the Castro Government, we should see to it that Cuban exiles are given arms, the training they need and all the equipment and planes to do the job.

The entire crisis is so completely unnecessary. It would not have occurred if President Kennedy hadn't failed in his courage during the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Even if there is little interest in the freedom of Cuba, certainly we should have an interest in our own safety, which is certainly threatened as long as Cuba's nuclear dagger is pointed at our hearts!

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STATIN

Henry Taylor

Soviet strength



OUR Central Intelligence Agency finds that while the Soviet swimming bear stalks increasingly all the seas of the world, including the Caribbean inside our own defense perimeter, the Red land and air forces are also being built up on a scale hitherto unrevealed.

During the period that Robert S. McNamara was Secretary of Defense he decommissioned more than 100 U.S. naval craft even while we were fighting the Vietnam war. Even to this day only two intelligence ships like the Pueblo are left out of the 10 that Mr. McNamara inherited. The Soviet swimming bear consists of 1,575 ships of recent construction, as described in this column on Dec. 16, against 894 built in our country in the same period.

THE Soviet air force has opened on a crash basis two new military pilots' schools at Stavropol and Saratov, and reopened at Boras the Oglebsk higher military aviation school which was closed in the late 1920s. Moreover, the Red air force is now shortening by four or five months the usual four-year pilot training course. Why?

In contrast, Gen. John P. McConnell, in his final testimony to the Senate Appropriations Committee before his retirement as chief of the U.S. Air Force, stated: "As I leave the Air Force it has less airpower than when I became its chief of staff four and a half years ago." And, as for outer space, former National Aeronautics and Space Director James E. Webb on retiring stated: "We are No. 2 in space with no hope of catching up in the immediate future." Moreover, the entire So-

viet space program is military-oriented.

The Red Army has approximately 150 divisions. The peak strength of the U.S. Army in the Vietnam war's most intense period was 19 divisions. Prior to the Vietnam war our army had 18 divisions.

The Red Army also has 2,815,000 soldiers and 12,250 military aircraft in the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact contingents. The opposing NATO, if you include the French forces, now has 1,950,000 soldiers and 4,200 planes in western Europe. The Warsaw Pact force now contains nearly a million more soldiers and about three times the air force of NATO.

FOR example, do we ever hear of the military force of Red satellite Bulgaria? Well, this force is aimed at adjacent Greece, which is the key to the Eastern Mediterranean. The Kremlin has gradually and quietly built and equipped new and growing forces that now heavily outnumber the strength of the Greek army and air force. Bulgaria's infantry is now highly mobile, new tank formations are constantly entering service and the Bulgarian air force is receiving the best fighter and bomber planes used by the Soviet air force itself.

More than 300,000 Russian troops are stationed in East Germany. These comprise 14 fully mechanized divisions. A full 42,500 Red soldiers ring Berlin alone. This East German contingent is the Kremlin's most western force, for several divisions stand only 93 miles from the Rhine. The divisions are the cream of the Red crop. "The best they've got," reports the CIA.

A weaker military posture inevitably produces a weaker political posture. The documented, grim warning in all this makes the Kremlin attempt to lull us to sleep patently absurd.